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**USAF, Army, OSD and Navy review(s) completed.**

MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE  
USCIB COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

MR. JEROME D. FENTON, OSD, CHAIRMAN

MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATE: Mr. Otto F. Otepka  
OSD: Mr. Jerome D. Fenton  
FBI: Mr. Bernard A. Wells  
CIA:   
NSA:   
ARMY: Brigadier General H. O. Paxson  
NAVY: Rear Admiral R. H. Rice  
AIR FORCE: Brigadier General Edgar A. Sirmeyer, Jr.  
USCIB: Major W. R. Culmer

SECRETARY: LCDR, P. J. Karl

ALSO PRESENT:

OSD: Mr. Hugh S. Erskine  
Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein  
Mr. Robert E. Drake  
Mr. Jerome T. French  
CIA:   
ARMY: Lt. Col. John B. Pratt  
Major E. L. Stackhouse  
Major C. C. Quigley  
NAVY: CDR Willis L. Thomas  
AIR FORCE: Lt. Col. Dean C. Gibbons  
Lt. Col. Overton Harris  
Major John H. Remick

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State Department review completed

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The second meeting of the USCIB Committee on COMINT Personnel Security Standards and Practices was held in room 3E869, the Pentagon, on 11 October 1955. The Chairman called the meeting to order at 1015. Before proceeding to the business of the meeting the Chairman circulated the text of a recent British Government report on the MacLean--Burgess case as printed in the New York Times. He remarked that the report presented a remarkable parallel to the Petersen case and recommended that the members give it the widest possible distribution within their respective agencies.

The Chairman noted that all reports had been submitted and circulated to each member for study. He suggested that the members first consider the recommendations which had been made with a view to establishing a small ad hoc drafting committee for the purpose of preparing a revision of USCIB Directive No. 5. The revision would be in light of reports submitted and would take into account the discussion of these reports at today's meeting. He suggested that comments on the recommendations be fairly general until the ad hoc committee is named, after which he said he thought the group could go into a more detailed examination of the reports. An item by item resumé of the discussion follows:


Item A--Determination of "Need to Know"

The Chairman observed that the reports indicate general agreement on the requirement for each member of USCIB to review the "need to know" aspect of the indoctrination procedures in his agencies, with the objective in mind of reducing the number of people. He noted that the Army, OSD and USCIB reports called for much stricter application of the "need to know" principle, the Army suggesting that the subject is one for constant continuing review and recommending compartmentation as a device to facilitate obtaining the objective. He said that the absence of detailed comments by other members on this item would be construed to indicate general concurrence.

There were no additional comments on Item A.

Item B--Pre-access screening and investigation

The Chairman noted that there was a pattern of agreement on a broadening of the background investigation with greater emphasis on personnel interviews. He remarked that observations were made on the use of the polygraph and the "10 year rule", stating that, while the two have no surface similarity, it would only be fair to observe that both items will provoke some differences of opinion in the later discussions. He said the Army suggested that requests for investigations of individuals nominated for COMINT clearance should be flagged in such



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a way as to alert field investigative units to the necessity of using mature, highly competent investigators. He noted also that the Army recommended a background investigation be conducted expeditiously on all persons given an interim clearance when nominated for access to COMINT, except in the case of general officers.

The Chairman observed that CIA called for a revision of USCIB standards to include the neighborhood investigation and interviews with close associates. Additionally, CIA called for information concerning persons whose family or associates are, or might be, foreign government officials, whether such governments are friendly or not. The "10 year rule" should be dropped, according to CIA. Finally, CIA observed that USCIB member agencies should be prepared to use the polygraph at least on persons strongly suspect, and, in any case where the national interest demands, the fullest verification by a security interview.


The OSD report called for more thorough pre-access screening to include an initial personal interview conducted by trained and experienced personnel for the purpose of eliminating potential undesirables. A requirement for a neighborhood check was also recommended.

The Navy similarly recommended that CIBD #5 be revised to require a neighborhood check in the investigation of all persons requiring COMINT clearance.

NSA recommended a favorable background investigation be completed before granting access to COMINT. Background investigations should be broadened to include neighborhood checks, credit checks, and interviews with more than 2 developed references. An intensive interview should be conducted with all personnel having access to COMINT, either civilian or military, and this would be desirable with the aid of the polygraph. Finally, NSA recommended that the investigative agencies handling investigations for the COMINT community should be given an educational lecture regarding the sensitivity of the COMINT business so that they will be aware of what is pertinent in these investigations.

The State Dept. supported the NSA view that all proposed indoctrinees should be given an interview aided by the polygraph, with the exception of high ranking officials appointed by the President with the approval of the Senate. (These people would already have been investigated under procedures established by the White House.)

The USCIB Secretariat indorsed the use of the polygraph in the pre-access personal interview and recommended that the background investigation include a neighborhood check (including a barracks check for military personnel).



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Item C--Clearance Standards

The Chairman observed that there was general agreement among the members that waiver authority for these standards should not be delegated too far. The ensuing discussions brought out the fact that exceptions are normally made only by the USCIB member or his deputy, with the exception that in the military services the heads of the COMINT operating agencies normally are empowered to grant waivers for personnel under their cognizance.

The State Dept. member reiterated the view of his department that any exception to the USCIB clearance standards should be made only by the full Board.

Item D--Indoctrination

The Chairman noted that there was no divergence on this item inasmuch as all members called for improvements.

Admiral Rice explained that indoctrination and education of the producers of COMINT were handled as parts of the Navy COMINT training program. He said all Navy personnel engaged in COMINT activities were required to refresh their recollections on COMINT security matters at periodic intervals. Further, he said he understood that each Navy COMINT unit has an organized security education program. With respect to improving COMINT security education, Admiral Rice expressed the hope that NSA might be able to take the Navy under its wing.


The Chairman observed that in the area of initial indoctrination and continuing education it would be fair to say that all concerned had expressed a general interest in better and more complete indoctrination procedures. He said he thought the ad hoc committee should be able to come up with something definite on this item.

Item E--Supervision and Control of COMINT Personnel

The Chairman noted that the members were unanimously in favor of closer supervision and compartmentation but expressed divergence in the methods of achieving these objectives.

Item F--Re-Investigation and Inspection of COMINT Personnel

The Chairman observed that there was uniformity among the members on a need for more frequent investigations, pointing out that again they differ on the methods to be used. The Chairman then noted the observations made by the members as follows:



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Air Force--Re-investigation at intervals not to exceed 5 years for all personnel having access to Category III COMINT, leaving the re-investigation of all other COMINT personnel to the discretion of the member agencies. Minimum requirements for re-investigation of civilian personnel should be a National Agency Check, a neighborhood check, and an interview conducted with the polygraph, if available. Finally, the minimum requirement for re-investigation of military personnel should be made only when specifically required by the member agency.

Army--A bring-up investigation on indoctrinated personnel at intervals not to exceed 3 years, such investigation to include a neighborhood check or, in the case of military personnel, a barracks or unit check. Bring-up investigation should be conducted on the more knowledgeable COMINT personnel at least every year, the scope to be gradually enlarged so that it would apply eventually to everyone indoctrinated for COMINT.

CIA--Member agencies should be required to conduct periodic personnel security interviews of all COMINT cleared individuals either with or without the polygraph.

OSD--Re-investigation consisting of at least a National Agency Check should be required at more frequent intervals, with 3 years as a suggested minimum. For key personnel, however, the reopened investigation should include a full background investigation.

Navy--Recommend that CIBD #5 paragraph 6 be replaced by the following:

"Persons cleared for COMINT and retaining that status permanently, or over a long period of time, shall be subjected to such periodic re-investigations as are considered necessary by the USCIB member concerned. Such reopened investigations shall be conducted by the investigative services available to the member agency. The minimum requirement for a reopened investigation shall consist of a National Security Check and a review of an up-to-date personal history statement or other similar documentation. Re-investigation shall be conducted whenever derogatory information arises about any individual cleared for COMINT and is relevant to his eligibility therefor.

"Where possible, re-investigations shall routinely be made at intervals not to exceed five years. Those individuals deemed by the USCIB member concerned to occupy particularly sensitive positions shall receive the most intensive, thorough re-investigation possible and shall be re-investigated as often as appropriate. A particularly 'sensitive' billet is considered to include one where

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the incumbent has the 'need to know', and has access to particularly sophisticated or a wide variety of cryptanalytic techniques, or who has a broad knowledge of U. S. COMINT resources and successes, or who may for other reasons be a likely target of foreign intelligence services."

NSA--Strict adherence to the re-investigation requirement to include a National Agency Check, a local law enforcement agency check, local credit check, neighborhood investigation and references, supervisors and fellow employees.

USCIB Secretariat--A re-investigation at least every 2 or 3 years to include a National Agency Check, a records check, a review of a current PHS and a neighborhood check.


The Chairman observed that it would be difficult to decide whether the interval between investigations should be 2, 3, or 5 years and suggested that the ad hoc committee address itself to that problem.

General Paxson observed that the economic factor played an important part in implementing these re-investigations. He said there did not appear to be enough money, agents, and time to re-investigate all COMINT personnel at frequent intervals.

Admiral Rice said he thought we would be kidding ourselves and USCIB if we set up requirements for re-investigations which could not be met. If there were not stated requirements for re-investigations, he said, he thought we could all beam our resources on the known targets. He concluded by pointing out that the backlog of the individual investigative services was constantly going up.

General Sirmeyer reiterated the Air Force view that people having access to Category III COMINT should be re-investigated periodically. He said it would be wrong to gear our security to the ability of an investigative agency to get the job done. Consequently he said we should be willing to pay the price.

The Chairman remarked that much of the material we seek to protect is just as important as AEC material, noting that Congress applauds the fact that AEC personnel are checked by the FBI. He stated that the Military Services have called for an improvement in the quality of their investigators in COMINT cases and he wondered whether the ad hoc committee should not consider an FBI investigation at the apex of sensitivity. In this way, he said, we would be sure of getting the best quality possible in our investigations.



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General Paxson referring to the "10 year rule" remarked that the Army is constantly fighting the battle of dropping investigation requirements on personnel in the higher echelons.

General Sirmeyer stated that the Air Force Security Service had discarded the "10 year rule", explaining that everyone to be indoctrinated for COMINT is required to be investigated.

Item G--Security Education

The Chairman noted that in this area the reports expressed uniformity on the need for more and better quality security education. He said he thought the members would agree that the ad hoc committee should come up with a practical program in this field, noting, of course, that any such program would necessarily vary in its application within the several agencies. General Sirmeyer remarked that it might be a good idea for NSA to establish minimum standards of COMINT security education for the others to follow.

Item H--Post Access Control

The Chairman noted that the only comments in this area were made by NSA as follows:

"The Security Office of the cognizant agency should be consulted in every case where an individual having access to COMINT is to travel officially or unofficially outside the continental limits of the U. S. This is to prevent several problems: (a) people who are too knowledgeable from going to certain places, (b) to give the Security Office an opportunity to give the individual a security briefing, and (c) to prevent certain individuals who are under current investigation from travelling outside the U. S."

In response to a question, the NSA member explained that his division had discovered that people were being assigned overseas, either on a temporary or a permanent basis, who for security reasons should never have been so assigned. He pointed out that many problems are encountered overseas which are not normally met in the States. Previously, he said, there had been no checking with the Security Division prior to assigning people to overseas positions. This has been corrected and now the Security Division approves or disapproves overseas assignments on the basis of security considerations. He concluded by stating that all personnel going overseas must have a security briefing.

The CIA member indicated that this was not a particular problem for his agency but recommended that it be considered favorably by the ad hoc committee. He explained that CIA requires all its personnel to clear with Security concerning certain outside activities, such as joining an organization, planning foreign travel for personal reasons, or the like.

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General Paxson observed that the problem is two-fold; on the one hand there are the operating people such as NSA and ASA, while on the other hand there are the policy people such as the Army G-2, who must travel to sensitive and dangerous areas on official business.

The NSA member explained that the Director himself decides on the need for travel or assignment overseas in cases where there is any doubt.

The Air Force member acknowledged that a real problem existed but observed that it was hardly feasible for the Military Services to attempt to give a pre-embarkation security briefing for all COMINT personnel.

The Chairman suggested that the members pause at this point for the selection of an ad hoc drafting committee. In that a small group would be more cohesive, he recommended that membership on the committee be kept to a minimum. The function of the drafting committee, the Chairman continued, would be to re-examine carefully all the reports submitted by the members and tie them in with a review of CIBD #5, the basic document. He said he hoped the group could meet promptly, with a view to having a tentative revision of CIBD #5 completed within 30 days. He suggested that the revision be prepared as a report for circulation to and consideration by the full committee. Such a revision of CIBD #5 would not be binding on any member, he said, until ultimately accepted by USCIB.

As to the composition of the group, the Chairman recommended a representative from NSA, CIA, OSD, and one individual to represent the three Services. The Service members present indicated their concurrence in having one Service member speak for all three.

The Chairman stated that he would nominate Mr. Robert Drake as the OSD member of the drafting group and suggested that members submit nominations direct to him. (Note: The following nominations were subsequently submitted to Mr. Drake:

NSA:

CIA:

Services: Major John H. Remick, USAF

It was generally understood that Major Remick could call upon other Service members for assistance as necessary. In this regard, Admiral Rice noted that CDR Thomas would be available until about the end of October, at which time he was scheduled for transfer.)

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The composition of the drafting committee having been agreed upon, the Chairman observed that the three areas of "need to know", indoctrination, and security education appeared to require no further discussion, inasmuch as all members were in general accord on these items. He suggested, therefore, that the committee address itself to those areas wherein there were sharp differences of opinion which must be reconciled. As a starting point, he referred to the area of General Recommendations and invited comments on each.

Army Recommendation--Appointment by each member agency of a cleared psychiatrist to operate with each agency on a consultant basis.

General Paxson explained that the psychiatrist would be an alternative to the use of the polygraph, adding his view that the Army did not anticipate any difficulty in setting up such an arrangement.

The NSA member, noting that his Agency employs a cleared psychiatrist, observed that there were probably many situations wherein the use of a trained psychiatrist would be preferable to the use of the polygraph. He explained, however, that NSA's decision to retain a cleared psychiatrist was made in an effort to control the indiscriminate consulting of uncleared psychiatrists by its employees. He pointed up the security risks involved when employees must bare their souls when seeking psychiatric treatment. NSA employees who need such treatment are encouraged to consult the Agency psychiatrist, he concluded.

CIA Recommendation--USCIB should employ a full time and highly qualified professional security officer to advise, guide, and coordinate security matters and policies in the COMINT field.

The CIA member reiterated his view that USCIB should have a professionally trained officer who could advise and brief the Board members on security problems. He explained that it was not intended that such an officer take over the security responsibilities of the individual agencies. But, in a loyalty case presentation, for example, such an individual would afford continuity on the problem. Additionally, he would be a single point of contact for all security officers of the several member agencies of USCIB.

The State Department member explained that his recommendations included the same general idea.

The NSA member expressed the view that by such an arrangement the members would be delegating their authority on COMINT security matters to the USCIB security officer.

The Air Force member said he thought the NSA Security Officer could be consulted by USCIB when professional advice was needed rather than have a full-time USCIB Security Officer.

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CIA Recommendation--USCIB must impress upon its members that COMINT operating officials must keep their appropriate security officers more completely informed of indications of COMINT compromise and pass to the security officers the necessary investigative or counter-intelligence leads.

There were no comments on this recommendation.

CIA Recommendation--USCIB should be briefed by the Chairman of this Committee that the "security job" is more than just initially investigating and clearing persons for COMINT. They should be urged to give their security officers the funds and the professionally trained persons to continually review, research, monitor and train all COMINT persons. The Board should be impressed with the need for continuing sensible and practicable counter-intelligence supervision of COMINT cleared persons.

There were no comments on this recommendation.

NSA Recommendation--As a means of further improving standards and practices, the establishment in the cryptologic services of spaces in their table of organization for (a) professional security officers, and (b) trained assistant security officers. These trained security people, either military or civilian, could be assigned as necessary to the various headquarters, security groups, and other segments of the cryptologic services.

The NSA member further amplified this recommendation by citing several instances, noted on his recent trip [redacted] wherein the COMINT field units could have used professional security officers to good advantage. He remarked that it takes a trained professional to ferret out the real problems when it comes to an effective program of security supervision.

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In response to a question by General Paxson, [redacted] indicated that the assignment of a cleared CIC man to advise the COMINT field units in security matters would be quite acceptable.

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There being no further comments on the General Recommendations, the Chairman suggested that the members move on to a discussion of the use of the polygraph.

The NSA member explained that the polygraph is used on all civilian applicants for positions with the Agency; it is not used, however, on military personnel assigned to NSA for a tour of duty. Pointing out that the instrument was first used by NSA in 1951 in a effort to reduce a large backlog of people awaiting clearance, [redacted] contended that the polygraph has, during the past four years, developed information

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which probably would not have come to light in any other way. He said he felt strongly that, if a member agency finds it cannot use the polygraph, it should as a minimum require a personal interview covering the same ground.

The CIA member, explaining that his agency favored the use of the polygraph, stated that it is used on every person assigned to work with the Agency regardless of the position for which he is slated. He remarked that the use of the instrument has been fully accepted by personnel in CIA. He noted that the polygraph is an extremely valuable aid to any investigation. Conceding that it would be difficult to institute a program in an agency which had not heretofore used the instrument, he said he wished to go on record as recommending its use where possible. He said the polygraph has given CIA the answers to many questions in serious cases. He concluded with the statement that

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The State Dept. member observed that the polygraph is not employed as a general rule in the State but is used occasionally for particular cases. He noted that Mr. McLeod had just recently testified to its usefulness before a Senate Investigation Committee. He explained that a polygraph interview often enables his department to get rid of undesirable people and at the same time verifies the innocence of people who might have been wrongly accused. He said that people are frequently proposed for COMINT clearances who cannot meet the criteria established, yet it would not be possible to terminate the employment of these people under the terms of Executive Order 10450. He said he thought if such people could be interviewed with the aid of the polygraph many of the cases could be resolved satisfactorily.

The FBI member stated that the Bureau does not advocate the use of the polygraph.

Col. Rubenstein, associating himself with the views of the CIA member concerning the polygraph, pointed out that the Military Depts. do have problems which some of the other agencies do not have to contend with. He said he thought it might be used to decide questionable cases as a starter, with the hope that it might eventually come to be generally accepted.

In response to a question by General Paxson, the FBI member explained that the Bureau's position on the polygraph was based on two factors; (a) it is not admissible in courts of law and (b) the Bureau believes that the instrument can be beaten. Turning to its application for COMINT cleared people in the Bureau, he explained that it was not used nor considered necessary especially in view of the fact that only some 25 people in the entire FBI have COMINT clearance.

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
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The Army member indicated that the polygraph would have definite advantage in helping to clear investigative backlogs, but he said he thought this was only a small facet of the problem in the Military Services. He said he wished to emphasize that while use of the polygraph might be acceptable for producer types, he did not think it would be practicable for consumer types. As an example he explained how difficult it would be for the Army to require a polygraph interview for an officer in G-4 who was to be cleared for COMINT only because he needed the information in connection with his logistics work.

The Navy member agreed that the difference between producer and consumer types was a big one in any question concerning the use of the polygraph. He explained that the instrument is used by the Navy as an investigative aid in the several Naval Districts where it has often resolved doubts and frequently obtained confessions from accused people.

The NSA member stated that it was important to remember the difference in techniques employed when using the polygraph. He explained that the technique used by NSA is completely different from the technique used by an operator in a criminal case. He said NSA has come a long way in the last 4 years in improving the polygraph interview technique.

The Navy member said he did not see how the Services could require a polygraph interview when one considered that its personnel were dispersed around the world.



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The Air Force member stated that his Service could not accept the polygraph as a general rule but suggested that it might be used in specific cases to expedite clearances. Although it might be possible for a team to travel from base to base with a polygraph, he said he did not favor its general use.

The Chairman, noting that there were no further comments on the use of the polygraph, suggested that the members consider the concept of mandatory inclusion of the neighborhood investigation as a component in both pre-access and re-investigation processes.

The NSA member said he thought the neighborhood investigation should be mandatory for both initial investigations and for the re-investigations.

The Chairman paused for a moment to make certain that the term "neighborhood investigation" meant the same to all members. It was generally agreed that the word "neighborhood", as used in this case, was more a human element than a geographic one and applied particularly to a person's associates during his free time.

The Army member agreed that much valuable information can be learned from close associates.

The Navy member said that he was definitely in favor of requiring a neighborhood check.

The Air Force member agreed that it was desirable but said the Air Force could not require it because of the inability of OSI to meet such a standard.

The USCIB member declared that if a choice has to be made between a neighborhood check and a check of listed references the emphasis should be on the neighborhood check.

The OSD, FBI, CIA and State members all agreed that the neighborhood investigation was a "must"

The Chairman inquired about the frequency of the re-investigation of COMINT personnel.

The NSA member expressed the opinion that the scope of the investigation is much more important than the frequency. He said he thought the intervals between investigations could be longer if the scope of the investigation were broadened.

General Paxson agreed and pointed out that the quality of the investigation is a very important factor. He said the Army had suggested

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a reinvestigation every 3 years because that would tie in with the normal shifting of military personnel every 3 years.

The Navy member explained that he had recommended no specific time interval because he felt that having an automatic re-investigation at stated intervals might develop an automatic point of view on the part of the agency. He said we should actually be thinking of the problem all the time and conduct such re-investigations as may be necessary regardless of the time interval.

The NSA member remarked that the requirements for a re-investigation should not be allowed to take the place of an effective security supervision program. He said such a program would bring out information which required a re-check.

The Air Force member said that he would stand by the recommendation in his report that the interval should not exceed 5 years.


In response to a question, the USCIB member replied that the member agencies of USCIB had recently reported 42,000 people cleared and indoctrinated for Category III COMINT.

The NSA member said it was important to bear in mind the principle of "need to know" which limits the access of personnel to COMINT. Consequently, he said, the figure of 42,000 people does not mean that every one of them has constant access to Category III COMINT every day. Rather, he said, it means that the people have been cleared for access in the event that the proper authority declares that they have a requirement for the information.

The FBI member remarked that the individual agency should determine how frequent the re-investigation process should be.

The CIA member observed that we tend to break down practices and standards if we set up arbitrary figures. He said he thought that personnel files should be reviewed at a minimum of every 5 years, in order to determine whether any action is deemed necessary. Rather than set a flat standard, he said he felt the individual agencies could best determine the need for re-investigations.

The State Dept. member declared that his experience has shown the need for periodic re-investigations for all personnel, not just COMINT personnel. He said that it would be possible to conduct the re-investigation of everyone at this time but it would be necessary to overcome a strong feeling of resentment. Nevertheless, he said State intended to go ahead on a limited basis.



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The Air Force member agreed that files should be looked at but he thought the arbitrary periodic re-check would not be too wise because many things could get into the files during the interim.

The CIA member hastened to point out that any security incident would have to be examined carefully as it occurs and not just filed until the time for a re-check of the files.

The NSA member added that an effective security supervision program would go a long way toward digging out the sort of information that would require a re-investigation. He said that two years ago, before the program was started in NSA, there were no cases pending; now, he stated, they have more than they can handle. The information is there, he concluded, if a person will just look for it.

General Paxson observed that the Military Services appear to have two major problems: (a) the inability of the investigative branch to cope with all of the requests and (b) the consumer problem.

There being no further discussion the meeting was adjourned at 1250 to meet at the call of the Chairman.



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